资本流动与财政竞争——来自中国30个省、市、自治区的平衡面板数据

Provincial-level Capital Flow and Fiscal Competition in China

在目前的财政分权体制下,地方政府为获取资本要素展开了激烈的财政竞争,包括税收竞争和支出竞争两种形式,地方政府更偏重于支出竞争。但是支出竞争导致地方政府不断提高生产性支出在公共支出中的占比,在支出结构出现"重基本建设、轻教育卫生和公共服务"的严重扭曲。同时,税收竞争也抑制了非生产性支出的提高,加剧了政府支出结构扭曲。中央政府应通过弱化地方政府财政竞争的内在动力、改变地方官员的激励机制,同时协调区域间利益分配、约束地方政府在公共支出上的自由裁量权,适度加大财政支出集权,以及深化市场经济改革等措施来改善政府支出结构存在的问题。

Under the Chinese-styled fiscal decentralization system,Chinese local governments pursue capital elements by launching fierce fiscal competition including tax competition and expenditure competition. This paper,based on provincial panel data from2006 to 2016,analyzes the form of fiscal competition among local governments in China and its impact on provincial-level capital flow.The results show that the local governments in China have integrated tax competition and expenditure competition in their fiscal competition,and local governments focused more on expenditure competition,which has exerted a relatively large impact on capital inflow. It is concluded that fiscal competition creates distortions in the structure of governments’ expenditure,which should be changed by weakening the internal power of local government fiscal competition,coordinating the distribution of benefits among regions,restricting the local government’s discretion in public expenditure and deepening the reform of market economy.