Ad hoc网络中一种基于转发联盟博弈框架的激励合作路由算法

Incentive Cooperation Routing Algorithm Based on Forwarding Coalitional Game Framework for Ad hoc Networks

为增强Ad hoc网络中节点合作的积极性,借鉴联盟博弈理论,针对节点之间数据包转发过程,定义了转发联盟博弈(forwarding coalitional game,FCG),建立了FCG支付模型,给出了确保形成的大联盟为稳定核的约束条件,并基于经典的按需路由算法对上述模型进行了实现,提出了一种基于FCG框架的激励合作路由(incentive cooperation routing,ICR)算法,并且通过仿真实验对该算法进行了有效性验证。仿真结果表明,该算法在分组投递率、端到端的平均时延、路由开销、联盟支付分配和中间节点转发数据包数量等方面的性能提高显著,能够有效地激励自私节点合作转发的积极性。

In order to enforce the enthusiasm of node cooperation in Ad hoc networks,in this paper,we define the packet forward⁃ing process between nodes as forwarding coalitional game(FCG)based on coalitional game theory,and establish the FCG pay⁃ment model.We analyze the constraint conditions for the resulting stable core of the grand coalition,implement the above model using the classic on-demand routing algorithm,and propose the incentive cooperation routing(ICR)algorithm based on forwarding coalitional game framework.Furthermore,we verify the effectiveness of this algorithm by simulation experiments.Simulation re⁃sults show that the performance of the proposed algorithm is improved significantly in term of packet delivery fraction,average end-to-end delay,routing overhead,coalitional payoff allocation and the number of packets forwarded by intermediate nodes,and it also can stimulate the cooperative forwarding initiative of selfish nodes.