债务违约曝光前后企业盈余管理行为研究——基于债务风险管理视角的实证检验

Earnings Management around Debt Default Announcements: An Empirical Research from Debt Risk Management Perspective

本文采用债务风险管理视角,通过双重差分模型系统研究了上市公司在债务违约曝光前后的盈余管理行为。研究发现,债务违约曝光前,债务违约公司的盈余管理行为相较于未发生债务违约公司没有明显差异,但在违约曝光后,其负向盈余管理程度更大,而且这种倾向性会随着违约程度的增加而加剧。这表明公司在违约曝光期间会综合权衡盈余管理和债务违约的成本,并且预期到高昂的违约曝光事后成本,因此在违约曝光之前不轻举妄动,等到债务违约曝光之后,实施负向盈余管理,以降低违约曝光带来的声誉损失和法律风险,从而控制债务违约的成本和风险。

We systemically investigate earnings management around debt default announcements from M debt-risk-m anagementM perspective.By adopting DID research design,we find that compared to companies without a violation,companies within a violation don't change their earnings management strategy before debt default announcements,but manage earnings downward after debt default announcements;and severer the violation,more significant their negative earnings management.All these results argue that companies in default trade off the costs of earnings management and debt default surrounding debt default announcements and try to control reputation loss and litigation risk by using the negative earnings management strategy.