代理成本、分析师关注与企业资本错配——基于管理层与控股股东自利视角

Agency Costs, Analyst Concerns and Firm Capital Misallocation——Based on the Self-Interest Perspective of Management and Controlling Shareholders

以2012-2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨代理成本是否是企业营业活动间资本错配的关键成因之一,并进一步研究分析师关注对代理成本与企业资本错配的调节效应。实证结果表明:代理问题越严重,企业资本错配的程度越大;分析师关注缓解了第一类代理成本对企业资本错配的关系,但对第二类代理成本与企业资本错配的关系无显著影响。本研究扩展了代理成本经济后果的研究,并丰富了微观层面资本配置的相关研究,提醒企业加强外部监督机制的重视和利用,从而为治理企业资本错配提供新的解决思路。

Based on the 2012-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share listed company as the research sample,is it one of the key causes of the misal location of capital between business activi­ties?This paper further studies the analyst's attention to the regulatory effect of agency costs and firm capital misallocation.The empirical results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the two types of agency costs and the firm capital misallocation,that is,the more serious the agency problem,the greater the degree of firm capital misallocation;the analyst pays attention to alleviating the relationship between the first type of agency cost and the firm capital misallocation.However,there is no significant impact on the relationship between the second type of agency costs and firm capital misallocation.This study expands the research on the economic consequences of agency costs,and enriches the research on Tirm capital misallocation at the micro level,reminds firms to strengthen the emphasis and utilization of external supervision mechanisms,thus providing new solutions for firm capital misallocation.