基于多方合作博弈的我国低碳环境政策优化路径

针对我国低碳转型环境政策的优化问题,本研究建立了中央政府、地方政府和高碳企业三方为博弈主体的动态博弈模型,引入中央和地方政府的宏观调控机制,求解博弈模型的均衡解并进行分析,找到影响我国低碳转型环境政策优化的关键因素。研究结果表明,低碳环境政策的优化需要中央政府、地方政府以及高碳企业三方的协同合作。在此基础上,进一步探讨了我国低碳转型环境政策的优化路径,并提出相应的对策和建议:提高中央政府的补贴力度,强化低碳减排的政策引导作用;合理制定地方政府补贴方案,适当引入外部资金;发挥政府宏观调控作用,充分调动高碳企业低碳减排的积极性。

In view of the optimization of China’s low-carbon transition environmental policy, this study establishes a dynamic game model of the central government, local governments and high-carbon enterprises as the main players, and introduces the macro- control mechanism of the central and local governments to solve and analyze the equilibrium solution of the game model to find the key factors affecting the environmental policy optimization of China’s low carbon transition. The research conclusions show that the optimization of low carbon environmental policy requires the cooperation of the central government, local governments and high carbon enterprises. On this basis, it discusses the optimization path of China’s low-carbon transition environmental policy, and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions: firstly, to improve the subsidy of the central government, strengthen the policy guiding role of low-carbon emission reduction;secondly, to rationally make local government subsidy plan, and appropriately introduce external funds;thirdly, to give play to the government’s macro-control role and fully mobilize the enthusiasm for low carbon emission reduction of high-carbon enterprises.