政府不同补贴模式下的闭环供应链定价决策

Pricing decisions for closed-loop supply chain under different government subsidies

研究考虑政府不同补贴模式的闭环供应链定价决策问题,构建政府实施再制造补贴和回收补贴两种模式下的闭环供应链定价决策模型,分析政府不同补贴模式对新产品定价及废旧产品回收的影响。研究表明政府的再制造补贴及回收补贴均会促使制造商和零售商降低新产品价格、第三方提高废旧产品回收率,且有利于增加闭环供应链成员及系统整体的利润。较之再制造补贴,政府的回收补贴机制更有利于提高废旧产品回收率。当单位再制造收益大于单位回收收益时,回收补贴机制更有利于降低新产品零售价格、提高市场需求。无论政府实施何种补贴机制,制造商总能获得最多的渠道利润,而第三方的获利总是最少。

To study the pricing decision problem of different government subsidy modes for the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC),the pricing decision model was constructed under the remanufacturing subsidy and recycling subsidy of CLSC,and the influence of different government subsidy modes on new product pricing and waste product recycling were analyzed.The research shows that government remanufacturing subsidies and recycling subsidies can both encourage manufacturer and retailer to lower the price of new products,and the third party to increase the recycling rate of waste products,which is beneficial to increase the profit of CLSC members and the system as a whole.Compared with the remanufacturing subsidy,the government s recycling subsidy mechanism is more beneficial to increase the recycling rate of waste products.When the income of unit remanufacturing is greater than that of unit recycling,the recycling subsidy mechanism is more conducive to reducing the retail price of new products and increasing the market demand.Regardless of the subsidy mechanism implemented by the government,the manufacturer always gets the most profits from channel,while third party always gets the least profit.