近海捕捞业船东投资的“锦标赛效应”——基于江苏与浙江渔村实地访谈的分析

Tournament Effect of Fishing Boat Owner Investment in Inshore Fishing Industry: Based on Onsite Interviews of Four Fishing Villages in Jiangsu and Zhejiang

近海捕捞业中渔船船东业绩不佳的情况下,捕捞渔船仍然大幅度增加。这一现象无法用公地悲剧理论和产能过剩的"潮涌"分析充分解释。2014年和2019年江苏省和浙江省四个渔村的两次实地访谈结果显示:近海捕捞业存在作业方式多样、渔船规模增大、用工成本易升难降等多项特征;船东的"无盈利投资"行为可以借鉴不依赖于技术的"锦标赛效应"更好地解释。基于此,缓解过度捕捞行为可以从信息提供、技术升级、提高组织化程度、降低信贷支持等方面制定政策。这也拓展了共有资源分析的理论视野。

Despite the poor performance of fishing boat owners in inshore fishing industry in recent years, the number of fishing boats has increased greatly. This phenomenon cannot be fully explained by the theories of Tragedy of the Commons and Wave Phenomena. In 2014 and 2019, two onsite interviews were made in 4 fishing villages of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The results of the interviews reveal that: the inshore fishing practices of the villages show such characteristics as diversified fishing patterns, increasing fishing boat scale, rising labor cost and so forth;and the "unprofitable investment" behavior of fishing boat owners can be better explained by referring to the Tournament Effect, which is independent of technology. On such basis, to reduce overfishing government needs to formulate policies from the aspects of information supply, technology upgrade, improving systematization and lowering credit aid. This study might help to expand the theoretical perspective of public resources analysis.