摘要
公众作为PPP项目所提供产品的消费者,其行为策略和政府、企业行为策略一样也会影响项目的健康运行.针对PPP项目中三方行为策略研究不足的问题,本文构建了地方政府、私营企业、公众三方演化博弈模型;探讨了不同主体的演化路径;分析了关联主体演化博弈模型的渐近稳定性,得出其在不同条件下有不同的稳定状态,且最优稳定状态属于可达稳定状态;最后根据达到最优稳定策略所需条件有针对性地提出了保证PPP项目健康运行的策略与建议.
As a consumer of PPP project products,the public’s behavioral strategy will affect the healthy operation of the project as well as the government and corporate behavior strategies.Aiming at the problem of insufficient research on tripartite behavior strategy in PPP project,this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of local government,private enterprise and public;discusses the evolution path of different subjects;analyzes the asymptotic stability of the evolutionary game model of related subjects,and concludes that it has different stable states under different conditions,and excellent steadystate is reachable stable state.Finally,according to the conditions required to achieve the optimal stability strategy,the strategies and recommendations for ensuring the healthy operation of the PPP project are proposed.
作者
李壮阔
吕亚兰
LI Zhuang-kuo;LV Ya-lan(School of Business,Guilin University of Electronic technology,Guilin 541004,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2019年第23期31-39,共9页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
广西软科学研究项目(桂科AB17205004)
桂林电子科技大学研究生科研创新资助项目(2018YJCX96)