官员晋升激励、要素市场扭曲与经济高质量发展——基于长江经济带城市的实证研究

Official’s Promotion Incentives,Factor Market Distortion and High-Quality Economic Development——Empirical Study Based on Yangtze River Economic Belt Cities

使用长江经济带2004-2016年108个地级及以上城市的面板数据,借助系统广义矩估计的动态面板模型与中介效应模型,实证考察了官员晋升激励、要素市场扭曲与经济高质量发展三者间的内在关系。研究发现,在传统的经济绩效考核观下,地方官员迫于晋升压力而扭曲生产要素市场的行为会对经济发展质量产生显著负影响,且要素市场扭曲的中介效应存在明显的区域异质性。进一步,在纳入"新型"考核指标后,官员晋升激励对经济高质量发展的影响逐渐转为正。

Based on the panel data of 108 cities at and above prefecture-level in the Yangtze River Economic Belt from 2004 to 2016, this paper applied systematic generalized moment to establish dynamic panel model and mediating effect model and empirically examined the relationship among local officials’ promotion incentives, factor market distortion and high-quality economic development.Considering with traditional performance assessment concept, local officials may distort factor market under the pressure of official promotion, which has a significant negative impact on economic develpment quality. Meanwhile, the mediating effect of factor market distortion has obvious regional heterogeneity. After the introduction of newly assessment indicators, official promotion incentives will gradually positively affected high-quality economic development.