中国农村低保精准识别的内在困境——贫困可见性与瞄准偏误及其解决思路

The Visibility of Poverty and Targeting Errors: The Targeting Dilemma of Rural Dibao in China and Its Solution

甄别指标是基层干部认定低保对象的主要工具,它浓缩地反映了国家政策、地方变通、村庄知识之间的复杂互动,也集中体现了农村低保瞄准的内在困境。论文基于民政部政策研究中心2016年全国城乡困难家庭入户调查数据,通过回归分析实证考察了农村低保甄别指标与瞄准偏误之间的关系。结果表明:中央、地方、基层干部对甄别指标有着不同的理解,最终被采纳的指标通常是高度可见的;可见性指标能够有效预测和指示个案瞄准偏误,但欠缺稳定性,倾向以增加“漏出”风险为代价规避“过保”错误;相对于远离公共生活的群体,参加过村务监督的困难家庭被“漏出”的概率要低得多,表明了贫困人群融入社区公共事务对低保精准识别的重要性。

Targeting indicators are the main evaluative tools for both the national policy makers and local officials who determine assistance eligibility.Thisprocess can be likenedtoa complex game between China s central and local governments,“street-level bureaucrats”,and community elites,who use the indicators to solve the targeting dilemma of rural Dibao.Based on 2016 national household survey data collected by the Policy Research Center of the Ministry of Civil Affairs,this study examined the relationship between targeting indicators and targeting errors.The results show that there were different understandings of targeting indicators among the different policy subjects.Although the indicators eventually chosen were usually quite visible,this couldsignificantly affect the risk of targeting errors.High visibility also increased instability;avoidingan inclusion error meant increasing the risk of an exclusion error.In other words,the families who did not care about or did not participate in public affairs ended up being ignored by the community.We suggest that poorer villagers should be encouraged to become more engaged with community governance to better monitor the behavior of rural elites.