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光伏发电产业补贴政策为什么进退难以自如?——基于政府与市场主体的博弈分析 被引量:7

Why the Photovoltaic Power Industry Subsidy Policy is in a Dilemma?——Based on the Game Theory of Government and Market Entity
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摘要 党的十八届三中全会提出,经济体制改革的核心问题是处理好政府与市场关系。近年来,在培育发展战略性新兴产业成为产业政策预期目标的现实趋向下,围绕着产业政策带来的激励扭曲而致使其存在是否合理的争议也在不断增多,其中骗取财政补贴问题更成众矢之的。考虑到政策预期能改变市场主体,市场主体也能改变政策效果,这就形成了“动机——行为——结果”的连锁反应。基于此,从博弈论视角出发,对补贴政策执行中形成的激励扭曲问题给予了理论阐释,并对光伏补贴政策演变及其对市场主体行为影响的历程进行全面总结,认为信息不对称的存在虽然会使补贴政策容易遭遇道德风险这一实践层面的困境而进退两难,但在政策预期目标的硬约束下基于政策执行中的实践试错反馈而实现政策方向和力度调控方式的转型是可以实现激励相容的,因此产业政策正向激励效应的最大化既是政策设计的初衷,也是实践执行中应该坚持的原则。 The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee explicitly pointed out that the core issue of economic reform is to handle the relationship between government and market properly.In recent years,cultivating and developing strategic emerging industries have become the goal of industrial policy,and the debate over whether industrial policy is justified by the incentive distortions is also growing,and fiscal subsidies caused by the fraud of subsidies has become the target of public criticism.Considering that the policy is expected to change the market entity,and the market entity can also change the policy effect,forming a chain reaction of“motivational--behavioral--consequences”.Based on these,this paper gives a theoretical explanation of the incentive distortion formed in the implementation of subsidy policies from the perspective of game theory.Then this paper summarized the evolution of photovoltaic subsidy policy and its influence on the behavior of market entity,and drew conclusions.The existence of information asymmetry may make subsidy policies vulnerable to the practical dilemma of moral hazard.However,under the hard constraints of the expected policy objectives,the transformation of the policy direction and the way of power regulation based on the trial-and-error feedback in policy implementation can promote the compatibility of incentives.Therefore,maximizing the positive incentive effect of industrial policy is not only the original intention of policy design,but also the direction that should be adhered to in implementation.
作者 聂新伟 徐齐利 Nie Xinwei;Xu Qili(Industry Research Center,State Information Center,Beijing 100045,China;School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China)
出处 《金融理论探索》 2019年第6期8-18,共11页 Exploration of Financial Theory
基金 国家社会科学青年课题项目“地方政府行为对旅游产业结构动态优化的作用机制研究”(16CGL023) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“中国绿色创新效率的空间分异、关联与制度供给研究”(18YJC790092) 北京市社会科学基金项目“京津冀冬季体育旅游产业联动发展及实现机制研究”(17YTC034) 北京市社科基金重点项目“北京市国有企业推动构建‘高精尖’经济结构的路径研究”(18GLA003) 北京市优秀人才青年拔尖团队项目“北京高精尖产业创新发展研究”(2017000026833TD01)
关键词 光伏产业 财政补贴 平价上网 产能过剩 Photovoltaic Power Industry Fiscal Subsidies Feed-in Tariff Excess Capacity
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