基于竞争战略选择的企业创新投入与产量决策动态博弈模型

A dynamic game model for firm’s decision-making of innovation input and yield based on choice of competitive strategies

本文把基于竞争战略选择的企业创新投入决策和产量决策纳入同一模型,改进了基于战略特征嵌入的博弈建模和约束条件分析新方法并用于动态博弈建模并进行验证。把不对称效用和创新投入参数嵌入博弈模型求解,然后应用等绩效约束条件并引入需求价格弹性约束条件,深入解析均衡解的性质,更为一般地导出了成本领先战略可能性定理和有无创新投入条件下两种纯战略产量之间、价格之间关系定理;发现了两种纯战略创新投入之间的关系定理,成本节约型和需求创造型创新对两种产品成本差距和效用差距的影响定理,以及两种纯战略财务识别条件,给出了Palepu假设的解析证明。研究表明,成本领先战略是内生的;相对于差异化产品,成本领先产品具有低成本、低效用特性和高产量、低价格、低创新投入(即低成本创新)的特性。研究还表明,两种竞争战略会在创新中分别扩大成本差距及效用差距,形成路径依赖;创新投入能增强成本领先产品的相对产量优势,可能弥补差异化产品的相对价格劣势。本文接着证明了有无创新投入条件下以营业利润率和资产周转率识别战略的Palepu假设。最后以中国汽车产业上市公司样本验证了本文识别条件并采用logistic回归模型验证该样本两种战略创新投入差异,得到证据支持。

This paper constructs an essential methodology framework that is integrated with improved modeling technique to understand the decision-making of innovation input and product yield under the choice of generic competitive strategies.The authors improve the modelling method of previous research by adopting Porter’s basic definition of differentiation strategy,i.e.his uniqueness and elasticity explanation of the differentiation as the original research idea.In addition,this study introduces the premises and basic assumptions,derives the asymmetric utility function,brings the firm's innovation input and yields decision into the dynamic equilibrium model.Based on this deduction,this paper derives firms’innovation input and yield equilibriums.Furthermore,this paper introduces new constraint conditions into the equilibrium analysis,proves the existence of cost-leadership strategy logically,and demonstrates the influencing mechanism of competitive strategy for innovation input.Firstly,this paper begins with the definition of uniqueness of differentiation strategy as Porter stated,and presents three basic assumptions:1)asymmetric utility of two firms’products,2)asymmetric price elasticity of demand of two products,and 3)iso-performance between differentiator and non-differentiator.This paper establishes a dynamic game model for innovation input decision-making and product yield decision-making based on the choice of competitive strategies,and resolves the subgame refined Nash equilibrium at both stages.Secondly,applying the assumption 2)and 3),this paper introduces the constraint condition of price elasticity of demand and employs iso-performance constraint conditions to optimize equilibrium solutions.Thus,the paper deduces the possibility theorem of cost leadership strategy.Thirdly,according to the equilibrium solutions and the constraint conditions above,this paper demonstrates the theorems of the innovation inputs relationships between two pure strategies, gives the theorems of the yield’s relationships and prices relationships of two pure strategies and their differenceswith or without innovation input. Furthermore, this paper gives the theorems of inputs’ impacts of cost-deduction innovation and demand-creation innovationfor cost-gap and utility-gap between products of two pure strategies. Fourthly, this paper gives the financial identification conditions for two pure strategies byverifying Palepu assumptions analytically. Lastly, the regression results are calculated based on the logistic model employing financial data of China’s ListedFirms. The results verify the identification conditions for two pure strategies and the theorems of the innovation inputs relationships between two purestrategies.This paper derives the possibility theorems of cost leadership strategy more generally than available researches showing that the strategy is endogenous.The results indicate that cost-leader’s product features lower-cost, lower-utility, and higher-yield, lower-price than differentiated product with or withoutinnovation input when their performance is equivalent. The research indicates that to gain equal performance,cost-leader needs merely lower innovation inputthan differentiator. In other words, it is “low-cost innovation”. The results also show that cost-leader and differentiator will achieve better performance whencost-leader uses cost-reducing innovation strategy, whereas differentiators use demand-creating innovation strategy. In addition, cost-leader and differentiatortend to amplify their cost-gap and utility-gap respectively through innovation, and form path-dependence. The paper also shows that innovation input willstrengthen cost-leader’s product yield advantage and offset possibly differentiator’s price weakness.Besides, applying DuPont-Palepu financial system indicators, this paper reveals that the necessary-sufficient conditions of strategy identification are thatdifferentiator can be characterized as higher operating profit margin than that of cost-leader, as well as lower asset turnover than that of cost-leader. Theseidentification conditions are in accord with Palepu assumptions, and provide an analytical proof for them. Meanwhile, this conclusion implies that “Porterpremium condition” isn’t necessary and does not have enough conditions of differentiation strategy.The empirical evidence from China’s listed firms in motor manufacturing supports some critical conclusions. The identification results based on Palepuconditions are in accord with the mainstream viewpoints. The empirical evidence also demonstrates the existence of innovative cost leadership strategy.Innovation isn’t the exclusive feature of differentiation strategy. Moreover, the results support the statement that innovation input of cost leader is lower thanthat of differentiator.This paper has made contributions to the development of the theory regarding generic strategy-innovation relationship, which lacks support of theoreticalmodel and empirical research. This paper provides a new path and development space for analytical modeling, and provides a conceptual framework for theintegration of previous empirical research results, which will push further empirical test and application of the model.