摘要
国际体系中实力最强的两个国家最易出现冲突和战争,两极体系下两个一级大国会持续对抗,这是所有现实主义理论乃至大部分主流国际安全理论的基本共识。然而在古希腊城邦时期和中国春秋时期的两极体系中,却出现了两“极”彼此结盟这种最高程度的合作行为。现有的合作理论和联盟形成理论均难以解释这种“两极结盟”现象。为解释这种反常现象,作者提出了大国竞争的“权力大/小”悖论和广义“稳定/不稳定”悖论,并以此为基础,揭示了两极体系下大国从冲突到结盟的具体机制。两极体系下大国为竞争更高的权力地位,容易受小国牵连而陷入冲突和战争。如果这种冲突陷入了“消耗战”并形成僵局,停止对抗就将成为双方的共同选择;如果此时大国因小国而再次陷入双输性对抗的风险依然显著,那么以结盟这种方式向小国释放信号,表达无意因小国而继续对抗的决心从而规避进一步的损失,将成为两个大国的均衡选择。“两极结盟”研究有助于拓展学界对联盟起源、两极体系性质、大国权力竞争等重要理论议题的理解,也为中美冲突管控的前景提供了新的思考视角。
All realist theories and most mainstream international security theories agree that the two most powerful states in an international system are the most vulnerable to conflicts and wars and that the two first-ranking great powers in a bipolar system are prone to perpetual confrontation.However,an alliance between the only two poles of a bipolar system,which is the highest level of cooperation the two poles can achieve,did occur in both ancient Greece and ancient China.To explain this anomaly,this article proposes the“more/less power”paradox and the general“stability/instability”paradox,and based on these,this article reveals the mechanism that can drive the two poles from confrontation to alliance.Under the bipolar structure,great powers risk being dragged into conflicts by small states while pursuing greater power.Once such a conflict evolves into a“war of attrition”and reaches a stalemate,both sides have an incentive to stop the confrontation.If the risk of being entrapped into a no-win confrontation by small states remains significant,forging an alliance to send signals to small states that they are determined not to continue the confrontation to avoid further losses would be the two superpowers equilibrium choice.This study helps broaden the academic understanding of important theoretical issues including the origin of alliances,the nature of bipolar systems and great power rivalry,and provides a novel perspective for the prospect of U.S.-China conflict management.
作者
杨原
Yang Yuan(Institute of World Economics and Politics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期38-68,156,157,共33页
World Economics and Politics