中国式分权与地方政府创新补贴偏向

Chinese Decentralization and Local Governments’ Innovation Subsidy Bias

本文利用手工搜集的2008-2016年中国上市公司创新补贴数据,实证检验地方政府创新补贴偏向。研究发现:中国式分权下,地方政府产生了创新补贴偏向。异质性检验发现,地方政府创新补贴偏向在样本期不存在显著的地区差异,晋升压力较大地区的地方政府有更严重的创新补贴偏向,地方政府对中央产业政策支持行业表现出较低的创新补贴偏向,而社会监督相对缺失地区政府的创新补贴偏向更为严重。机理分析表明,地方官员追求短期经济绩效以及创新补贴高风险、缓见效的特点使得地方政府产生了创新补贴偏向。短期内调整地方政府财政补助结构,长期考虑减少甚至取消地方政府财政补助是深化市场主体经济体制改革的题中应有之意。

Using data on innovation subsidies of listed companies in China from 2008 to 2016, this paper focuses on local governments’ innovation subsidy bias. We find that under the Chinese-style decentralization, local governments have innovation subsidy bias. The heterogeneity test finds that local governments’ innovation subsidies does not have significant regional differences during the sample period. Local governments with higher promotion pressures have higher innovation subsidy bias, and local governments show lower bias for industries supported by industrial policies. At the same time, innovative subsidies are biased while the regions are lack of social supervision. The mechanism analysis shows that local officials’ pursuit of short-term economic performance and the high-risk and slow-acting characteristics of innovation subsidies have led to local governments’ innovation subsidies bias. Through the Instrumental variable and other various robustness tests, the empirical findings of this paper are still valid. This paper believes that adjusting the structure of local governments’ financial subsidies in the short term and reducing or even cancelling local government financial subsidies, in the long run, is of great significance to deepening the reform of China’s market economy.