基于前景理论的绿色行为决策演化博弈模型

An Evolutionary Game Model of Green Behavior Decision Making Based on the Cumulative Prospect Theory

绿色行为决策主体受到经验、利益、感知能力与风险偏好等因素的影响,难以做到完全理性。基于此,文章基于有限理性假设,在演化博弈分析框架中应用前景理论,用前景理论中的收益感知矩阵代替传统期望效用理论的客观收益矩阵,构建了更符合现实情形的绿色行为决策主体的演化博弈模型,分析了政府的监管成本、企业采取绿色行为的成本、企业在采取绿色行为和未采取绿色行为而受到处罚时的收益前景价值感知以及政府积极监管的概率和风险传递系数对决策主体策略的影响,并通过数值仿真验证了模型结论。最后根据研究结论给出了促进企业绿色化的政策建议。

It is difficult for the main body of the green behavior decisions to be completely rational because of experience,interests,affect the ability of perception and risk preferences and other factors. Based on the hypothesis of rounded ration,this paper integrates the cumulative prospect theory into the evolutionary game. The traditional objective return matrix of expected utility theory is replaced by the return perception matrix of prospect theory and the evolutionary game model of the main body of the green behavior decisions constructed which is more in line with the reality. This paper analyzes the government’s supervision cost,the cost for enterprises to adopt green behavior,the perception of profit prospect and value when enterprises are punished for adopting green behavior or not adopting green behavior,and the influence of probability and risk transfer coefficient of government’s active supervision on decision-making subject strategy.The model conclusion is verified by numerical simulation analysis. Finally,according to the research conclusions,some policy recommendations for promoting the greening of enterprises are given.