摘要
针对旧工业建筑改造投资决策阶段利益分配不均的问题,首先通过实际调研确定核心利益相关者即开发商与原企业职工,并分析其利益需求与角色定位,在博弈论基本假设的前提下,构建纯战略博弈模型;然后,在考虑双方策略集合的概率后,建立混合战略博弈模型,进一步借助期望收益函数、引入惩罚系数,得出混合战略下的纳什均衡修正;最后,通过对模型的讨论分析,提出了利于推进双方利益分配的合理化建议。
In view of the problem of uneven distribution of interests in the investment decision-making stage of the old industrial building transformation, the core stakeholders, namely the developer and the original enterprise employees, are first determined through actual research, and their interest needs and role orientation are analyzed. Under the premise of the basic assumptions of game theory, a pure strategic game model is constructed, and the hybrid strategic game model is established after considering the probability of the two-party strategy set. The Nash equilibrium correction under the hybrid strategy is obtained by further using the expected return function and introducing the penalty coefficient. Finally, through the discussion and analysis of the model, the rationalization suggestions for promoting the distribution of interests between the two parties are proposed.
作者
陈旭
谷玥
田卫
高明哲
CHEN Xu;GU Yue;TIAN Wei;GAO Ming-zhe(School of Civil Engineering,Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China;Architectural Design and Research Institute of Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China)
出处
《土木工程与管理学报》
北大核心
2019年第6期86-91,共6页
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金(51478384
51808424)
住房与城乡建设部项目(2018-R1-009)
关键词
旧工业建筑改造
开发商
原企业职工
博弈模型
old industrial building renovation
developers
original employee
game model