国家审计监督抑制国企盈余管理行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis for National Auditing Supervision to Suppress Earnings Management of State-owned Enterprises Behavior

基于目前国有企业的盈余管理行为较为普遍的现状,在我国以审计全覆盖为战略目标的大环境下,综合运用行为经济学及演化博弈论的方法对国家审计监督抑制国有企业盈余管理行为进行研究。首先运用有限理性理论分析国有企业盈余管理行为动机,进而运用演化博弈论构建国家审计部门与国有企业之间的博弈模型,并以央企的相关数据为基础进行数值仿真分析,得出影响国家审计部门及国有企业双方策略选择的有效因素,最后基于演化博弈仿真的结果及国有企业盈余管理的行为动机提出国家审计监督策略的优化建议。

Based on the current situation that the state-owned enterprises'earnings management behavior is more common,in the context of China's auditing full coverage as a strategic goal,the behavioral economics and evolutionary game theory are used to study the government audit supervision strategy of state-owned enterprise earnings management.Firstly,we use bounded rationality theory to analyze the motives of state-owned enterprise earnings management behavior,and then the evolutionary game theory to construct the game model between government audit department and state-owned enterprise,and next carry out numerical simulation analysis based on relevant data of central enterprises,and explore the effective factors of strategic choices between the two state-owned enterprises.Finally,based on the results of evolutionary game simulation and the behavioral motives of state-owned enterprise earnings management,the optimization suggestions of government audit supervision strategy are given.