管理层过度自信、独立财务顾问与业绩承诺可靠性

Management Overconfidence、Independent Financial Adviser and Reliability of Performance Commitment

以我国2008—2016年A股上市公司发起的并购重组交易事件为样本,研究了管理层过度自信的上市公司在并购和重大资产重组交易中是否具有更低的目标企业业绩承诺可靠性,以及选聘独立财务顾问是否有助于抑制管理层过度自信对于目标企业业绩承诺可靠性的不利影响。同时,进一步探究了不同特征独立财务顾问的差异及经济后果。研究结论显示:管理层过度自信的上市公司更大可能会对目标企业虚高的业绩承诺水平和盈利能力过于乐观,因而在并购交易完成后更容易面临业绩承诺不可靠的风险;整体而言,上市公司聘请独立财务顾问并没有使目标企业的业绩承诺不可靠问题得到有效缓解,独立财务顾问并没有发挥其应有的风险过滤职能;选聘独立财务顾问确实能显著提高存在管理层过度自信上市公司的业绩承诺可靠性,说明独立财务顾问确实能有效抑制管理层过度自信对目标企业业绩承诺可靠性的不利影响;进一步区分独立财务顾问的特征后发现,选聘目标企业所在地的独立财务顾问能更有效地缓解业绩承诺不可靠问题,但高声誉的独立财务顾问并没有呈现出更大的优势,表明上市公司在选聘独立财务顾问时,更注重地域特征,而非高声誉的独立财务顾问。

This paper takes the M&A restructuring events initiated by A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2008 to 2016 as a sample to study the impact of management overconfidence and the selection of independent financial advisers on the reliability of target enterprises'performance commitments,and whether independent financial advisers can restrain the negative effects of management overconfidence on the reliability of performance commitments,and finally,the differences and economic consequences of independent financial advisers with different characteristics will be explored.The results show that:(1)Listed companies with overconfident management may be overly optimistic about the high level of performance commitment and profitability of the target company shareholders.After the completion of the M&A transaction,it is easier to face the risk of unreliable performance commitment of the target enterprise;(2)On the whole,the independent financial advisers selected by listed companies in M&A restructuring transactions did not play their due role of M&A risk filtering,and hiring independent financial advisers did not effectively alleviate the unreliable performance commitment of the target enterprises;(3)Under the condition of management overconfidence in listed companies,the selection of independent financial advisers will better restrain the adverse effects of management overconfidence and improve the reliability of performance commitments of target enterprises;(4)After further distinguishing the characteristics of independent financial advisers,it is found that the selection of independent financial advisers will effectively alleviate the unreliable performance commitments of the target enterprises after the completion of M&A and reorganization transactions;(5)Compared with the low-reputation independent financial advisers,highly reputable independent financial advisers do not show a greater advantage in helping listed companies avoid the unreliability of target corporate performance commitments,that is,when selecting independent financial advisers,Reputation standards are not an absolute standard of validity.