从“万科控制权之争”看中国企业双层股权结构之改革

On the Reform of the Dual-Class Share Structure of Chinese Enterprises from the Battle for the Control of Vanke

我国企业现行的“同股同权”单一股权结构已难以适应企业战略发展和多样化改革之需要。“万科控制权之争”证实“同股同权”的单一股权结构在应对外来“野蛮人”入侵时因股权治理屏障不完善而使创始人痛失控制权,相反,京东的双层股权结构则可以确保企业创始人融入社会资本时以少量的股权牢牢掌握公司的控制权,从而确保创始股东的经营理念和企业文化得以传承。本文剖析了万科“同股同权”单一股权结构在抵御“外来野蛮人”入侵时的弊端,借鉴了京东“双层股权结构”在保障创始人控制权和企业发展战略的成功经验,在此基础上,提出了我国企业分类分级推行双层股权结构改革的政策建议。

Current single share structure"one share,one vote"does not match strategic development and diversified reforms of enterprises.The"battle for the control of Vanke"proves that single share structure can't defend against external takeover threat,which leads to founders'loss of control due to imperfect equity management.On the contrary,the dual-class share structure of Jingdong can ensure that the founders firmly control the company with a small amount of equity when they integrate into social capital,thus guaranteeing that the business philosophy and corporate culture of the founding shareholders can be inherited.In this paper,we analyze the disadvantages of Vanke's single share structure"one share,one vote"in resisting the external takeover threat,and draw lessons from the successful experience of Jingdong"dual-class share structure"in protecting the founders'control rights and enterprise development strategies.On this basis,we put forward the policies and proposals of implementing the reform of dual-class share structure for China's enterprises by category and classification.