摘要
专用性、风险性与规模性是交易费用产生的主要依据,都对经营组织的产权排他能力、处置能力和交易能力有重要影响。但契约安排的主要功能是节约交易费用,交易费用的大小决定契约选择。农业家庭经营组织宜根据交易费用的大小来选择不同的契约安排:农业资产专用性、风险性与规模性都比较强时,产权行为能力比较弱,交易费用较高,需要选择定租契约;农业资产专用性、风险性与规模性都比较弱时,产权行为能力比较强,交易费用不高,采用工资契约;农业资产专用性较弱、风险性比较强时,交易费用处于中等状态,且产权主体的行为能力较强,选择分成契约可能性较高。进一步运用广东20个地级市2759个农户问卷数据实证检验上述理论假说,总结出农业交易特性、组织行为能力与契约安排之间的制度匹配逻辑。
Attributes of specificity,risk and scale will affect the operation organization's exclusive ability,handle ability,and transaction ability.What's more,these three attributes all produce transaction costs.Nevertheless,the main function of the contractual arrangement is to reduce transaction costs and the transaction costs determine the forms of contractual choice.The rural family operation organization should choose different contractual arrangement under different constraint of transaction cost:if the degrees of agricultural attributes of specificity,risk and scale all are stronger,the behavior abilities of property rights are all weak and transaction costs are higher,then the rural family operation organization need to choose the fixed rent contract;On the contrary,if the degrees of agricultural attributes of specificity,risk and scale all are weaker,the behavior abilities of property rights are all strong and transaction costs are lower,then the fixed wage contract should be chosen by the rural family operation organization;otherwise,the sharing contract is the best choice with higher specificity and lower risk as the behavior abilities of property rights are all high and transaction costs are median.And these conclusions are consistent with the empirical data of farmer's survey collected from 2779 households 20 prefecture-level cities in Guangdong,China.
作者
何一鸣
张苇锟
罗必良
HE Yi-ming;ZHANG Wei-kun;LUO Bi-liang
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期31-45,共15页
Industrial Economic Review
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目“农村土地与相关要素市场培育与改革研究”(项目编号:71333004,项目负责人:罗必良)
国家自然科学基金应急项目“农地确权的现实背景、政策目标及效果评价”(项目编号:71742003,项目负责人:罗必良)
国家特支“万人计划”青年拔尖人才项目(项目编号:W02070352)
关键词
农业资产特性
组织行为能力
交易费用
契约选择
制度匹配
agricultural attribute
organization behavior ability
transaction cost
contractual choice
institutional matching