摘要
以新环保税制为背景,将环境保护税与政府其他环境规制行为结合起来,运用演化博弈理论,研究地方政府与排污企业的策略互动行为,并将公众举报纳入政府收益函数当中。基于地方政府及排污企业不同策略间净收益的大小,得到12种演化路径,以此为基础将企业减排创新的过程分为发展、成长和成熟期进行数值仿真。结果表明:政府监管强度对企业减排的影响程度视后者减排净收益大小而定,而前者强弱与否主要取决于监管成本的高低;企业减排发展初期过低的环保税率并不会引致企业进行减排技术创新;减排成长期的企业进行减排创新的决策则视政府策略而定;处于成熟期的减排企业则会主动进行减排技术创新。因此,在多种规制工具并行的前提下,政府应视企业所处发展周期的不同制定环保税率,同时辅以一定的税收减免和补贴力度,以降低企业治污成本,促使排污企业在生产过程中向减排技术创新演化。
Under the background of the new environmental protection tax system,this paper combines environmental protection tax with other government environmental regulation actions,studies the strategic interaction between local government and sewage enterprises by using evolutionary game theory,and incorporates public reporting into the government revenue function. Based on the net income between different strategies of local governments and sewage enterprises,twelve evolutionary paths are obtained. On this basis,the process of enterprise emission reduction innovation is divided into development,growth and maturity stages for numerical simulation. The results show that the impact of the intensity of government regulation on enterprise emission reduction depends on the net income of the latter,and the former mainly depends on the level of regulatory costs;too low environmental tax rate at the early stage of enterprise emission reduction development will not lead to technological innovation;enterprises in the growth stage of emission reduction will make emission reduction innovation decisions. The policy depends on the government’s strategy,while the emission reduction enterprises in the mature stage will take the initiative to innovate in emission reduction technology. Therefore,on the premise of the concurrence of various regulatory tools,the government should set environmental protection tax rates according to the different development cycles of enterprises,supplemented by certain tax relief and subsidies,in order to reduce the cost of pollution control and promote the evolution of emission reduction technology innovation in the production process.
作者
骆海燕
屈小娥
胡琰欣
LUO Haiyan;QU Xiao’e;HU Yanxin(School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an Shannxi 710061,China)
出处
《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期1-12,共12页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基金
陕西省社会科学基金项目(2018D22)
关键词
环境规制
环保税
数值仿真
environmental regulation
environmental protection tax
numerical simulation