利益分析视角下的地方政府行为研究——以28个典型邻避事件为例

Local Government Behavior Research from the Perspective of Interests Analysis:A Study of 28 Typical NIMBY Cases

我国城市化进程的加快,促使公共产品供给与公共服务需求间出现不均衡,公共危机事件频发,地方政府在冲突治理中担负着重要的职责。基于利益分析视角,构建"利益诉求--利益激励--行为策略"分析框架,对典型邻避事件中地方政府利益诉求、利益激励性制度体系及政府行为策略选择三要素加以分析,揭示出地方政府行为策略选择直接反映了地方政府的利益诉求,同时受"激励-约束"制度体系的导向影响,地方政府支持式行为成为平衡经济发展与社会稳定、化解邻避冲突的最优策略。迫切需要从保障公民有效参与、完善利益补偿机制、健全政治约束机制及完善风险防范几方面构建动态性激励制度体系,规范政府冲突治理行为。

The acceleration of urbanization in China has led to disparities between the supply of public goods and the rapidly growing demand for of public services. Public crisis incidents occur frequently, and local governments play an important role in conflict governance. The study, based on the perspective of interests analysis, constructs a framework featuring 3 aspects, i.e. interest appeal, interest incentive and behavioral strategy,and analyzes the three elements-the interest appeals of the local government, the interest incentive system and the choice of government behavior strategy in a typical NIMBY case. The study reveals that the local government behavior strategy directly reflects its interest appeals, and is influenced by the orientation of the incentive-binding system. The supportive behavior by the local government is the optimal strategy to balance economic development and social stability, and solve the conflict. There is an urgent need for the government to change the concept of governance, construct a dynamic incentive system that ensures effective public participation, improves the mechanisms for compensation, political constraints and risk forestalling, and regulates government’s behavior in conflict governance.