央地政府间精准扶贫的委托代理关系研究

Study on Principal-Agent Relationship of Targeted Poverty Alleviation between Central and Local Governments

央地政府在精准扶贫过程中存在一种委托代理关系,为有效规避委托代理中的"逆向选择"和"道德风险",有必要研究基于央地政府间委托代理关系的精准扶贫激励机制。将精准扶贫与委托代理模型相结合,分析了作为委托方的中央政府与作为代理方的地方政府的委托代理关系,构建了信息不对称下中央政府为风险中性、地方政府为风险规避时中央政府在监督和不监督两种典型情境下的委托代理模型,并进一步对两种不同情境下的各项指标进行探讨。结果表明:在委托代理机制下,中央政府与地方政府在精准扶贫上的利益具有一致性;中央政府对地方政府精准扶贫的有效监督可以降低信息不对称程度并有利于实现双方收益的帕累托最优;中央政府激励策略的改变会影响地方政府精准扶贫的努力程度;地方政府精准扶贫的努力程度与其努力成本系数、风险承担系数、风险规避度、总收益增加系数及其他外生不确定性变量等密切相关。基于此,从中央政府的角度出发,可以通过强化精准扶贫监督机制、完善精准扶贫奖惩机制、健全精准扶贫考核机制等方式激励地方政府积极扶贫、积极脱贫。

Central and local governments have a principal-agent relationship in the process of targeted poverty alleviation.It is necessary to study the incentive mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation based on the principal-agent relationship between central and local governments,which in order to effectively avoid the"adverse selection"and"moral hazard"in the principal-agent relationship.This paper combines accurate poverty alleviation with principal-agent model,analyzes the relationship between the central government which as the client and the local government which as the agent,constructs the principal-agent models under the two typical conditions that central government supervise and do not supervise,which central government is risk neutrality and local government is risk averse of information asymmetry,and further explore the various indicators in two different situation.The results show that the central government and the local government have the same interests in the accurate poverty alleviation under the principalagent mechanism;the central government’s effective supervision of the local government’s accurate poverty alleviation can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and contribute to achieve the Pareto Optimality of the two parties;the change of the central government’s incentive strategy will affect the level of efforts of the local government to focus on accurate poverty alleviation;the degree of effort of local government’s accurate poverty alleviation is closely related to its effort cost coefficient,coefficient of risk-bearing,the degree of risk aversion,total revenue increase coefficient and other exogenous uncertainty variables.Based on above,from the perspective of the central government,we can encourage local governments to actively alleviate poverty,and actively out of poverty by means of encouraging the accurate poverty alleviation supervision mechanism,improving the reward and punishment mechanism of accurate poverty alleviation,completing the assessment mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation,etc.