摘要
本文检验了官员任期及产业政策周期交错导致的政策不确定对企业R&D投资的影响。以2006-2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,结果表明,官员任期与五年计划周期交错程度与企业R&D投资增长率显著负相关。周期交错对国有企业、非高新技术企业和产权制度较差地区企业的R&D投资的抑制效应更明显。进一步检验发现,周期交错抑制企业R&D投资的潜在途径是降低财政补贴和企业风险承担。以上结果为制定基于创新驱动的官员激励政策和产业政策提供新思路。
This paper examines the impact of periodic interleaving between official tenure and industry policies on firm’s R&D investment. Using the sample of listed companies from 2006 to 2014,this paper finds that the growth rate of enterprises’ R&D investment has a significant negative relationship with periodic interleaving between official tenure and Five Year Plan,and that the crowding-out effect of periodic interleaving on innovation investment of state-owned enterprises,non-high-tech enterprises and enterprises in the area of low degree of property right is more obvious. And further tests show that the potential approach of the crowding-out effect is to reduce enterprises’ financial subsidies and risk taking. These results provide a new way for the development of incentive mechanism based on innovation driving.
作者
戴静
刘放
张豪
许传华
Dai Jing;Liu Fang;Zhang Hao;Xu Chuanhua(School of Finance,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205;Hubei Research Center of Financial Development and Financial Safety,Wuhan 430205;Wuhan Wuchang State-owned Capital Holdings Investment Operation Group Co.,Ltd.,Wuhan 430061;China Institute of Aeronautical Integrated Technology,Beijing 100028)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期100-114,共15页
Management Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(16YJC790013)
武汉市人民政府博士资金资助项目(2018-2020年度)
关键词
官员任期
五年计划
周期交错
政策不确定
企业创新投入
official tenure
Five-year Plan
political periodic interleaving
policy uncertainty
enterprises’ R&D investment