碳减排成本信息不对称下的供应合同设计

Supply Contract Design under Asymmetric Information of Carbon Emission Reduction Cost

在碳限额与交易政策下,针对一个供应商和一个制造商的供应链博弈模型,研究了双向碳减排成本信息不对称下供应商的减排成本信息披露与供应合同设计策略,并通过算例分析讨论了不同条件下的企业决策行为和利润变化。研究结果表明,供应商在减排成本披露上的说谎行为对制造商来说并非完全不利,有时可以提高低减排成本制造商的实际利润。其次,供应商可以通过合同设计保证风险中性的制造商接受合同,但不对称信息使制造商的期望利润与实际利润存在偏差,导致制造商的实际利润可能小于保留利润。另外,供应商只能制定针对高减排成本制造商的合同,因此在某些情况下只能保证高减排成本制造商获得保留利润,导致低减排成本制造商的实际利润可能小于高减排成本制造商,这说明制造商的减排成本并不是越低越好。

Under the policy of carbon cap-and-trade,the strategy of supplier′s information disclosure and supply contract design under the asymmetric information of two-way carbon emission-reduction cost for a supply chain game model of a supplier and a manufacturer was studied.Through the analysis of examples,the decision-making behaviors and profit changes of enterprises under different conditions were discussed.The three main conclusions are as follows.Firstly,suppliers’ lying behavior on the disclosure of emission reduction cost is not completely unfavorable to manufacturer,and sometimes it can increase the actual profit of the manufacturer with low emission reduction cost.Secondly,through contract design,supplier can guarantee the risk-neutral manufacturer to accept the contract,but the asymmetric information causes deviation between expected and actual profit of the manufacturer,and the actual profit may be less than the reservation profit.In addition,suppliers can only develop contracts for the manufacturer with high emission reduction cost,so in some cases,only the reservation profit of manufacturer with high emission reduction cost can be guaranteed,leading to a situation where the actual profit of the manufacturer with low emission reduction cost may be lower than that of the manufacturer with high emission reduction cost,which means that the manufacturer′s emission reduction cost is not the lower the better.