抵押与农户信贷违约风险:逆向选择还是道德风险?

The impact of collateral on the credit default risk of rural households : information asymmetry or moral hazard ?

本文基于山东和江苏两省2013年的农户田野调查数据,使用具有样本选择性的Probit模型,考察了抵押对农户信贷违约风险的影响、作用机制及其异质性,有效解决了以往文献往往忽略的样本选择问题引致的估计偏误。研究发现,抵押对农户信贷违约风险具有显著负面影响,即主要降低了银行与农户的事前信息不对称,缓解了逆向选择引致的信贷风险,而非缓解了事后的道德风险引致的信贷风险。但考虑农户的异质性后,农村金融市场同时存在逆向选择和道德风险,其中抵押对没有还贷意愿和还贷能力的农户的贷款主要起到缓解道德风险的作用,而对具有还贷意愿和还贷能力的农户的贷款主要起到缓解逆向选择的作用。

Using recent survey data of rural households and the probit model with sample selection,this paper investigates the impact of mortgage on farmers’credit default risk,its mechanism and heterogeneity,also effectively solves the estimation errors caused by the sample selection problem which is often ignored in previous literatures.The results find that mortgage has a negative impact on farmers’credit default risk,that is,it mainly reduces the information asymmetry in advance between banks and farmers,alleviates the credit risk caused by adverse selection,rather than moral hazard.However,considering the heterogeneity of farmers,there are adverse selection and moral hazard in rural financial market.Mortgage plays a major role in alleviating moral hazard for farmers who have no willingness and ability to repay loans,while for farmers with willingness and ability to repay loans it mainly plays a role in alleviating adverse selection.