高管限薪与公司业绩——来自2015“限薪令”自然实验的证据

Executive compensation limit and enterprise performance:Evidence from natural experiment of pay ceiling order

本文基于2015年1月1日实施的《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》(简称"限薪令")这一准自然实验,从实证上检验了高管限薪政策对国有企业经营业绩的影响.通过建立双重差分模型(DID)和运用倾向匹配得分法(PSM),研究发现"限薪令"政策对国有上市公司的经营业绩有显著负向影响,动态作用效果显示政策实施第二年比第一年的影响更加显著.异质性分析表明,"限薪令"政策对中央企业、高薪酬组企业和大规模企业经营业绩的冲击大于地方国有企业、低薪酬组企业和小规模企业.未来可以考虑建立与国有企业特征相适应的高管薪酬制度,通过加快市场化改革以促进企业价值最大化.

Based on the natural experiment of the"central management enterprise salary system reform"(pay ceiling order),which was implemented on January 1,2015,this paper empirically examines the impact of policy on the performance of listed state-owned enterprises.By using the difference-in-differences(DID)model and propensity score matching(PSM)method,we find that"pay ceiling order"has a negative effect on the operating performance of listed companies.Further studies on the dynamic effect of"pay ceiling order"show that the second year is more significant than the first year after implementation.It is also found that the policy has the heterogeneity influence on the performance of different types of enterprises.Results show that performance of central government-owned,high compensation and large-scale enterprises declined more comparing to the local government-owned,low pay and small-scale enterprises.Our findings suggest that executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises should follow the enterprise features and market-oriented reform should be accelerated to maximize the enterprise value.