考虑风险偏好的污染治理外包合同设计

Outsourcing contract for pollution abatement service with risk preference consideration

研究排污者将污染治理业务外包给治污者的两部制线性计费的合同设计问题.在考虑双方风险偏好的前提下讨论3种情况下的最优合同参数:完全信息、不完全信息提供单一合同、不完全信息提供可选合同.结果表明:1)当信息完全时,治污方的薪酬均等于其治污成本与风险成本之和,只能获得保留收益.2)当信息不完全时,排污方总可以通过提供可选择合同提高自身收益.3)不同的风险偏好组合下,单位可变支付随边际治污成本和环境扰动的变化是不同的.4)双方均为风险中性时,排污方收益最大;而双方均为风险规避时,排污方收益最小.

This paper studies the contract design problem between a polluter and an environmental company(called "EC" hereafter) providing pollution abatement service. The risk preference of both sides are considered and the payment from the polluter to the EC is assumed to be composed of two parts: A fixed payment and a linear variable payment depending on the realized abatement. The optimal fixed/variable payments are discussed in three scenarios: Under complete information, a single contract under information asymmetry, a menu of contracts under information asymmetry.The results show that: 1)When the information is complete, the expected revenue of the EC is equal to the sum of pollution abatement cost and risk cost. 2)When the information is incomplete, the polluter can always benefit from providing a menu of alternative contracts rather than a single contract. 3) The effect of abatement cost and environmental uncertainty on the optimal variable payment depends on the risk preference of two sides. 4)The polluter gets maximal/minimal expected utility when both sides are risk neutral/averse.