地方官员晋升竞争与企业资源配置效率——基于我国397家上市公司面板数据的实证分析

Promotion Competition of Local Officials and Resource Allocation Efficiency in Enterprises——An Empirical Study based on Panel Data of 397 Listed Corporations in China

本文采用2009-2016年间中国397家上市公司的非平衡面板数据,考察了地方政府官员晋升竞争、市场分割与企业资源配置效率之间的关系,并重点分析了市场分割对地方政府官员晋升竞争与企业资源配置效率之间关系的调节作用。研究发现:地方政府官员晋升竞争会对辖区内企业资源配置效率产生抑制作用,且这种抑制作用在国有企业中体现得更为显著;市场分割会对企业资源配置效率产生负面影响,还能强化官员晋升竞争对企业资源配置效率的抑制作用。研究结论为探索政府影响企业生产经营活动的内在机理提供了一种新的思路,对优化企业资源配置效率具有重要的现实意义。

The paper,by analyzing the unbalanced panel data of 397 Chinese listed corporations from 2009 to 2016,makes a research on the relationship among the promotion competition of local government officials,the market segmentation and the resource allocation efficiency in enterprises.It focuses on studying the role that the market segmentation is playing in regulating the relationship between the promotion competition of local government officials and the efficiency of resource allocation in enterprises.The study found that the promotion competition of local government officials reduces the efficiency of resource allocation in enterprises,especially when it comes to state-owned enterprises.Moreover,market segmentation plays a role in restraining the resource allocation efficiency and strengthening the inhibitory effect of the promotion competition.The conclusion,which provides a new perspective to explore the internal mechanism of the governmental influence on enterprises production and operation activities,will be of practical significance in optimizing the resource allocation efficiency in enterprises.