摘要
股权再融资往往意味着企业存在大量的融资需求,而实践中普遍存在的股权再融资后立即现金分红的现象有悖于募集资金的优序使用原则。基于此,本文从管理层自利视角出发,在对企业股权再融资后现金分红的行为偏好检验的基础上,进一步选取管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动作为管理层自利程度的代理变量,探索企业股权再融资后现金分红倾向的边界条件,为该行为背后的代理动机提供证明。基于2007~2017年所有A股上市公司样本,研究发现,企业的确存在股权再融资后立即现金分红的行为倾向;而较低的管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动会加剧企业股权融资对现金分红的促进作用。进一步研究发现,企业股权再融资活动会给现金分红带来消极的市场反应。上述研究结果表明,管理层自利是股权再融资的重要推动因素,而这一行为会给企业利益造成损害。
Seasoned equity offering(SEO) often means that enterprises arein great needs of financing, while the common phenomenon of cash dividends following SEO seems tobeagainstthe priority use of raised funds. This paper examines the preference of cash dividends after SEOfrom the perspective of management self-serving. We also use the growth rate of management compensation and pledge activity as proxy variables ofmanagementself-servingto explore the boundary conditions ofthe main effect above, to supply proof to the agency motivation behind this behavior. Using samples of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, the resultsshows that enterprises do have the tendency topay cash dividends immediately after SEO. Besides, low growth rate of management compensation and equity pledge activities will intensify the promotion effect of SEO on cash dividends. In addition, in order to further investigate cash dividends behavior after SEO, this paper adds supplementary test and confirms that SEO activities have a negative impact on the marketreactiontocash dividends. The above results show that management self-serving is an important driving factor for SEO, and this motivationmay cause damages to the interests ofthe company.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期44-53,共10页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“本地任职、政治关联与企业财务行为:中国关系情境中独立董事视角的理论构建与实证检验”(项目编号:71772001)