党组织嵌入国有企业公司治理:基础理论与实施机制研究

Party Organizations Embedded in Corporate Governance in SOE: Basic Theories and Implementation Mechanisms

与传统公司法范式所面对的“普通”公司不同,国有企业由于特殊的两权分离、多元的公司目的而在公司治理问题上呈现出其个性。无论是从理论、经验证据或是实证研究的角度观察,党组织嵌入国有企业公司治理,不仅可以有效抑制内部人控制问题,还可以使国有企业在经济效益和社会、政治目标的追求上协调融合。与此同时,为了防止在实践中可能出现的过度政治干预等问题,党组织在对董事会、监事会和经理层实施“双向进入、交叉任职”时,应当根据不同公司机构的地位与作用设置不同的进入比例上下限,并且特别注意党委书记和董事长由一人担任时所可能引发的代理成本问题。对于“讨论前置”,则应当在准确把握其制度内涵与功能的前提下,通过对信息披露、责任追究以及包括董事会秘书在内的合规机制等配套制度加以完善。

Due to the special ownership and control separation issue and multiple corporate goals,there are very special corporate governance issues in Chinese SOEs.Both theoretical analysis and empirical evidences prove that party organizations embedded in corporate governance in SOEs could help to improve their performance.However,to prevent causing too much political intervention,when implementing two-way entry and cross appointment system,party organization should set a minimum and maximum limit.In addition,the system designer should pay more attention to possible agency cost brought about by one person serving secretary of party committee and chairman of the board at the same time.Regarding upfront discussion decision,more supporting systems should be brought in to improve it.