控股股东股权质押与上市公司会计稳健性

Controlling Shareholder’s Share Pledge and Accounting Conservatism of Listed Companies

本文以2011~2017年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了控股股东股权质押对上市公司会计稳健性的影响,研究发现:控股股东的股权质押行为促进了上市公司会计稳健性的提升,且质押比例越高,会计稳健性的提升越明显;在财务风险较低的上市公司中,控股股东股权质押对会计稳健性的正向影响更加明显。进一步研究发现,由于债权人对会计稳健性有更高的要求,在长期债权比例较高的上市公司中,控股股东股权质押对会计稳健性的影响较小。本文从债权人视角考察了控股股东股权质押的经济后果,对深入认识股权质押和上市公司会计政策选择具有一定的参考价值。

Based on the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share listed companies from 2011 to2017,this article investigates the impact of controlling shareholder’s share pledge on accounting conservatism with K-W model.The empirical results indicate that controlling shareholder’s share pledge can promote the accounting conservatism of listed companies.Then,this paper tests whether this relationship is different as financial risk varies.The results show that controlling shareholder’s share pledge affects more in listed companies with lower financial risks,compared with those of higher financial risks.In addition,this paper finds that due to the creditor’s demand for accounting conservatism,in the listed companies with high proportion of long-term creditor’s rights,the impact of equity pledge on accounting conservatism is relatively small.The conclusions are still robust after controlling the endogeneity problems by PSM and 2 SLS regression.This paper examines the political consequences of controlling shareholders’ share pledge from the perspective of creditors and complements the literature of controlling shareholders’ share pledge.