霍布斯理论中的政治契约与相互信任——论在自然状态下订立政治契约的困难

Political Contract and Mutual Trust in Hobbes’s Theory——Concerning the Predicament of Contract in the Hobbesian State of Nature

霍布斯的政治契约理论面临着守约困难的问题。这一困难反映出霍布斯式自然状态中的正当性危机。既有研究对上述困难提出了两种解决方案。其一是将短期博弈和长期博弈区别开,政治契约的必要性在于使得个体之间的长期利益不受制于个体短视的影响。其二是赋予自然状态下的个体以新的动机,使得个体的行动抉择不再单单是对自身利益进行理性计算之后的结果。但是,以上两种方案都不成功,前者低估了霍布斯自然状态的残酷性,而后者忽视了自然状态中的互不信任同样也可以渗透到规范性层次。

The political contract in Hobbes’ s theory faces a dilemma,for it is impossible for the Hobbesian individuals to make a contract. This dilemma reflects a further dilemma of normativity. There are at least two strategies to solve the dilemma. The first grounds political contract on the long-term benefits of individuals,whereas the second attributes a new and egoistic motive for individuals. The first strategy appears more promising,but underestimates the degree of cruelty of the state of nature,whereas the second strategy ignores the fact that the mutual distrust in the state of nature may permeate into the level of normativity.