供应链合作广告的改进及最优策略

Study on Improvement and Optimal Strategy of the Cooperative Advertising in Supply Chain

研究由一个零售商和一个制造商组成的二级供应链纵向合作广告最优策略问题,其中产品的销售量由零售商地方性广告水平和制造商全国性广告水平共同决定。分析在合作广告研究中广泛采用的销售反应函数存在的缺陷,提出了一种新的销售反应函数。将制造商作为领导者而零售商作为追随者的合作广告决策问题建模为Stackelberg主从博弈,对博弈均衡及最优策略的相关性质进行了理论分析,通过数值模拟对理论分析的结果进行了验证。

The optimal strategy of vertical cooperative advertising in a two-echelon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer is studied, in which the sales volume of products is determined jointly by the retailer’s local advertising level and the manufacturer’s national advertising level. This paper analyzes the defects of sales response function which is widely used in cooperative advertising research, and puts forward a new sales response function. The cooperative advertising decision problem with a manufacturer as a leader and a retailer as a follower is modeled as a Stackelberg master-slave game. The game equilibrium and the related properties of optimal strategy are analyzed theoretically. The results of theoretical analysis are verified by numerical simulation.