公司高管权力、内部控制质量与代理成本

Corporate Executive Power,Internal Control Quality and Agency Costs

本文基于代理问题视角,以中国A股上市公司作为研究对象,实证研究公司高管权力、内部控制质量与代理成本的关系。研究发现,公司高管权力与第一类代理成本呈显著正相关关系,高管权力越大,第一类代理成本越高。内部控制质量与第一类代理成本呈显著负相关关系,内部控制质量越好,第一类代理成本越低。

This paper conducts an empirical study on the relationship between executive power,internal control quality and agency cost by drawing on the observation data of listed companies.The study finds that the power of senior executives is positively correlated with the agency cost.The more concentrated the power is,the higher the agency cost is.The quality of internal control is negatively correlated with agency cost.The better the quality of internal control is,the lower the agency cost is.