系族企业违规的同群效应

Peer Effect of Family Business Violation

从“治理同构性”视角研究了系族企业违规的同群效应及其作用机制。结果发现,系族企业内存在违规同群效应,且在其他违规公司董事长在大股东单位兼任的情况下更强,证明了这种效应是源于系族企业的“治理同构性”。进一步,本文从股价同步性视角对系族企业“治理同构性”的经济后果进行了检验,发现系族企业的股价同步性比非系族企业更高。

This paper tested the peer effect and its mechanism of family business violation from the perspective of“governance isomorphism”.It is found that,violation peer effect indeed exists in family business,and it has stronger power in firms with chairman from major shareholder.This phenomena proves that,this effect stems from the“governance isomorphism”of family business.We further tested the economic consequences of the“governance isomorphism”from the perspective of stock price synchronization.Then we find that,the stock price synchronization of family business is higher than that of other enterprises.