宽松货币政策下银行风险承担行为的博弈分析——基于银行内部及银行间竞争的视角

Game Analysis of Banks’ Risk-taking Behavior under Loose Monetary Policy——From the Perspective of Competition within and between Banks

以宽松货币政策环境为背景,运用博弈论剖析同一商业银行内部行为主体之间以及不同商业银行机构之间在利益博弈下对风险承担行为选择的均衡策略,论证了商业银行在货币政策传导中绝不是风险中性的简单媒介,而是具有主观风险偏好的金融参与主体,从而拓展对传统货币政策传导渠道的认识,指出研判货币政策效果时须考虑金融稳定,最后从完善货币政策目标体系和传导机制以及优化商业银行长效激励约束机制和风险预警机制等方面提出了政策建议。

Under the background of loose monetary policy environment,this paper adopts game theory to analyze the balanced benefit strategy of risk-taking behavior between the internal subjects in the same commercial bank and different commercial bank institutions.It demonstrates that commercial banks are not simply risk-neutral media in monetary policy transmission,but financial participants with subjective risk preference.Therefore,it expands the recognition of the traditional monetary policy transmission channels,pointing out that financial stability should be taken into account when judging the effect of monetary policy.Finally,policy suggestions are put forward from the aspects of perfecting the target system and transmission mechanism of monetary policy,optimizing the long-term incentive and restraint mechanism and risk pre-warning system of commercial banks.