知识与真信念——《泰阿泰德》201a-c分析

Knowledge and True Belief:An Analysis on Theaetetus 201a-c

柏拉图在《泰阿泰德》中分析了三个关于"知识"的定义,其中第二个定义称"知识就是真信念"。我们想要分析的201a-c一节反驳了这一定义。照理说,无论是从文本本身,还是从文中苏格拉底的态度上讲,这一反驳都应该是简洁明了的。但是,现有对此的阐释不仅相当复杂,而且还引发了诸多困难,从而影响了人们对柏拉图知识论的理解。实际上,这一部分论证的核心不是对比知识和真信念,而是直截了当地指出,"真信念"并不涉及知识性的"真",因而也就不可能是知识,从而反驳了"知识就是真信念"。

Plato tried to elucidate three definitions of "knowledge" in Theaetetus.And the second one defined "knowledge" as "true belief" has been analysed and disproved by Plato at "201 a-c" of this dialogue.By all ways,especially according to Plato’s declaration,this rebuttal section should be both concise and clear,however,it’s not like what we expected.The existing interpretation of this part is not only quite complicated,but also causes many difficulties,and these problems constantly mislead people about the understanding of Plato’s theory of knowledge.It is to be pointed out directly in the paper that "true belief" does not imply "truth" which is the core character of knowledge,thus it is not knowledge.