公司债特殊条款、债券评级与会计稳健性

Special Bond Covenants,Bond Credit Rating and Accounting Conservatism

本文基于债券持有人利益保护视角,以手工收集的2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司发行的公司债特殊条款为样本,研究公司债特殊条款对会计稳健性的影响,以及债券评级的调节作用,并基于公司治理机制和代理冲突角度,探究公司债特殊条款影响会计稳健性的作用机理。研究发现,公司债特殊条款数量越多(约束强度越大),发债主体会计稳健性水平越高;债券评级越低,公司债特殊条款对会计稳健性的正效应越大。进一步研究发现,在国有企业、公司治理水平低以及代理冲突严重的情况下,公司债特殊条款数量对债务主体会计稳健性具有正效应。本研究为不同缔约主体以及政府监管部门防范债券违约风险、治理违约事件、提高债券契约执行效率提供理论参考与经验借鉴。

Based on the perspective of the protection of bondholders'interests,this paper studies the impact of the special bond covenants on accounting conservatism and moderating effect of bond credit rating by using the special covenants manually collected from the corporate bonds issued by Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016.And we explore the mechanism of special covenants of corporate bonds on the accounting conservatism based on the perspective of corporate governance and agency conflict.The results show that the number of special bond covenants has a significant positive impact on the accounting conservatism of the bond issuer;The lower the bond rating,the greater the positive effect of the special covenants of corporate bonds on accounting conservatism.The further research show that the positive effect of the number of special bond covenants on accounting conservatism exist in the case of state-owned enterprises,and the companies with lower corporate governance and serious agency conflicts.This research provides theoretical reference and experience for different contracting parties and government supervision departments on how to prevent bond default risk,handle default events,and improve execution efficiency of bond contract.