摘要
公共性与营利性的双重需求决定了我国大型国有商业银行股东身份、经营目标、信息不对称等特殊属性,或可在坚持"三会一层"大框架的前提下,内部结构相关问题给予适时修正,从而保证其行政管理和市场盈利的有效平衡。本文通过对其治理状况的分析和考察,得出"一股独大"的股权状况有其积极效应,通过排除董事会行权障碍,改进信息披露制度,可以实现股权结构集中之下的决策适当。
The dual needs of publicity and profitability determine the identity of shareholders, business objectives, information asymmetry and other special attributes of China’s large state-owned commercial Banks. It may be possible to timely modify the small internal structure on the premise of adhering to the "three meetings and one layer" big framework, so as to ensure the effective balance of its underlying logic.Based on the analysis and investigation of its governance, this paper concludes that the equity situation of "one dominant shareholder" has its positive effect. By removing the obstacles of the board of directors to exercise the right and improving the information disclosure system, appropriate decision-making under the centralized ownership structure can be realized.
作者
李燕
杨朝越
Li Yan;Yang Zhaoyue
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第7期147-159,共13页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
司法部2018年度国家法治与法学理论研究项目18FB2032《新金融监管背景下大型商业银行公司治理研究》
关键词
大型商业银行
公司治理
董事会行权
信息披露
large-scale commercial banks
Corporate Governance
Authority of the Board
Information Disclosure