摘要
关于终极控制人特征与股东掏空关系的研究大多停留在静态的研究上,没有考虑企业融资状况不同是否会影响这种关系。选取6754家上市公司2014—2016年的数据作为研究样本,对过度融资下终极控制人特征与股东掏空关系进行研究。结果表明:在过度融资企业中终极控制人对公司的控制权与股东掏空程度之间存在显著的正相关关系;终极控制人对公司的所有权与股东掏空程度之间存在显著的正相关关系;国家或者政府终极控制的企业在过度融资时控股股东的掏空程度较高,而私人终极控制的企业在过度融资时与控股股东掏空程度之间的关系并不显著。
Most of the studies on the relationship between ultimate controller characteristics and shareholder hollowing are static,without considering whether the different financing conditions of enterprises will affect the relationship.In this paper,the data of 6754 listed companies from 2014 to 2016 are selected as samples to study the relationship between ultimate controller characteristics and shareholder hollowing under over-financing.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the ultimate controller’s control of the company and the degree of shareholder hollowing,and that the ultimate controlling person’s ownership of the company has a significant positive correlation with the degree of shareholder hollowing,and that there is a significant positive correlation between the ultimate controlling person’s ownership of the company and the degree of shareholder hollowing.An enterprise that is ultimately controlled by a state or government.The degree of hollowing of controlling shareholders is higher under over-financing,while the relationship between private ultimate-controlled enterprises and the degree of hollowing of controlling shareholders is not significant.
作者
李志雪
LI Zhixue(Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001)
出处
《常州工学院学报》
2019年第5期79-84,共6页
Journal of Changzhou Institute of Technology
关键词
终极控制人
股权性质
过度融资
掏空
ultimate controller
nature of stock rights
over-financing
hollowing