摘要
2018年中国出台资管新规后,影子银行活动受抑制,经济虽“脱虚”但未“向实”。本文通过构建一个内生融资约束的异质性企业模型,研究影子银行限制政策对宏观经济的影响。研究表明,影子银行限制政策一方面导致资本总量下降,减弱了宽松货币政策对投资的刺激效果;另一方面使资本向高效率企业集中,提高了资源配置效率。资管新规虽然提高了经济发展质量,但“一步到位”的监管模式也产生了一定的经济成本。因此,政府应当“堵疏结合”,在限制影子银行的同时,疏通货币政策影响中小和民营企业的传导机制,促进经济高质量发展。
After the implementation of the Asset Management Regulation in 2018,shadow banking in China suffered a clear restriction,but the decline of the virtual economy has not resulted in an improvement of the real economy.By constructing a model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous financial constraints,this paper studies the macroeconomic impact of shadow banking restriction policies.Research shows that shadow banking restriction policies not only lead to a decrease in the gross investment and the weakening of the stimulus effect of expansionary monetary policies on investment,but also promote the transfer of capital to high-efficiency firms,thereby improving resource allocation efficiency.While the Asset Management Regulation has been promoting improvement in the quality of economic growth,the“only-one-step”regulation has also led to certain economic costs.Therefore,policy makers should be more concerned about the financing difficulties of SMEs and private enterprises while restricting shadow banking activities,in order to contribute to high-quality economic growth.
作者
彭俞超
何山
Peng Yuchao;He Shan
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期47-69,共23页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金(71903208)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金
中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划的资助
关键词
资管新规
影子银行
经济高质量发展
货币政策
Asset Management Regulation
shadow banking
high-quality economic growth
monetary policy