供应链应收账款融资模式引入信用保险的企业行为研究——基于前景理论的演化博弈模型

Research on Enterprise Behavior of Introducing Credit Insurance into Supply Chain Receivable Financing Mode:Evolutionary Game Model Based on Prospect Theory

供应链应收账款融资模式是有效解决中小企业融资难的一种方法,而核心企业在供应链应收账款融资模式中作为最终的还款来源,一旦出现违约情况,代价十分高昂,由保险公司对这部分应收账款提供信用保障,将有效控制核心企业出现的信用风险。为此,架构了一个包含中小企业、核心企业、保险公司的交易演化博弈模型,基于前景理论,构造了中小企业的价值函数,通过对该模型的演化均衡过程的比较静态分析,论证了保险公司的费率水平、赔偿比例、追偿比例等因素,均会对中小企业与核心企业交易的博弈均衡产生影响。最后,根据论证结论,从保险机制发挥作用角度,就促进交易均衡的达成提出了对策。

Accounts receivable financing model of supply chain is an effective method to solve the fi-nancing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.The core enterprise in supply chain ac-counts receivable financing mode is treated like the final source of repayment.When the core enterprise defaults,the price will be very high.However,by providing credit guarantee to this part of the accounts receivable by the insurance company,the credit risk of the core enterprise will be effectively controlled.This paper builds a evolutionary game model.The model involves small and medium-sized enterprise,core enterprise and insurance company,and based on the prospect theory,the value function of small and medium-sized enterprises is constructed,and the evolution equilibrium process of the model is an-alyzed statically.And the evolutionary equilibrium process of the model is analyzed atatically.The re-sults show that the rate level,compensation ratio and recovery ratio of insurance companies all have an impact on the game equilibrium between small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises.Fi-nally,from the point of view of the function of insurance company,this paper puts forward some coun-termeasures and suggestions to promote the further development of transaction balance.