“自然化的现象学”是否可行——从当代认知科学的视角看

Is “Naturalized Phenomenology” Feasible?——From the Perspective of Contemporary Cognitive Science

现象学家丹·扎哈维近年来在“自然化的现象学”论题下提出了这样一种观点,该观点认为现象学能够为认知科学提供更有价值的对人心智活动的解释模型,并且现象学对意识的种种先验分析能够对当代认知科学的研究有所助益。文章将以“物体恒常性”以及“拥有感”为案例,通过对比现象学与认知科学对这两个具体人类心智现象的解说方式,审视扎哈维的这一观点在具体事实层面是否可行。并由此指出现象学解释模式与当今时代立足于脑影像技术之上的当代认知科学的解释模式之间并无法兼容。

In recent years,phenomenologist Dan Zahavi proposed“Naturalized Phenomenology”,which suggested that phenomenology could provide a more valuable interpretation model of psychological phenomena for cognitive science and that the transcendental analyses of consciousness could be helpful for the development of cognitive science.This paper takes two specific human psychological phenomena——“object constancy”and“sense of ownership”——as test cases.It compares the interpretation offered by phenomenology and that offered by cognitive science and examine whether Dan Zahavi’s idea is feasible in these two specific examples.It argues that the phenomenological interpretation model is incompatible with the interpretation model of cognitive science based on brain imaging technologies.