一种旧的新逻辑:实质归纳理论

An Old-fashioned New Logic: The Material Theory of Induction

诺顿在古德曼和亨普尔等人的启发下,结合他的科学哲学研究背景,提出一种不同于他所定义的“形式归纳理论”的“实质归纳理论”,强调归纳的局部应用性,拒斥普遍的归纳推理模式。归纳推理的基础往往建立在具体领域的事实之上,因此所有的归纳推理都是局部的。诺顿认为归纳推理模式是由事实授权的,我们可以通过考察这些事实的可靠性来评估归纳风险。同时实质归纳理论不再区分归纳的事实部分和模式部分,所以不易受休谟问题的影响。但我们发现,诺顿的归纳辩护面临着亟待解决的问题,其理论也遭受多方面的批评。实质归纳理论是归纳逻辑领域的前沿性成果,引起了逻辑学界和科学哲学界的广泛关注,一定程度上体现了归纳逻辑的强劲生命力和广阔的发展前景。

Inspired by Nelson Goodman and Carl Hempel,combined with the background of his philosophy of science research,John Norton put forward a theory which he defined as“material theory of induction”.Different from“formal theories of induction”,it emphasizes the application of local induction and rejects universal schemas of inductive inference.The basis of inductive inference is often based on the facts of the specific field,so all the inductive inferences are partial.Norton believes that the schemas of inductive inference is licensed by the facts,and we can assess the risk of induction by examining the reliability of these facts.At the same time,it is not easy to be influenced by Hume’s problem by concluding that the material theory will no longer distinguish between the factual and schemas parts of the induction.However,we find that Norton’s inductive justification is faced with problems to be solved,and his theory has been criticized in many ways.Material theory of induction is a frontier achievement in the field of inductive logic,which has aroused widespread concern in the field of logic and philosophy of science.To some extent,it embodies the strong vitality and broad prospect of inductive logic.