摘要
平台最惠国条款是数字市场反垄断的新热点问题,但其竞争效应和反垄断政策尚不明确。本文主要对平台最惠国条款的效率效应理论和竞争损害理论进行分析,重点分析了合谋促进效应和市场封锁效应,据此提出损害理论适用和反垄断审查重点等政策问题。
Platform MFN clauses is a hotly debated antimonopoly issue in the digital market,but its competitive effect and antimonopoly policy are still unclear.This paper mainly analyzes the efficiency effects theory and competition harm theory of platform MFN clauses.We focus on the collusive promotion effects and foreclosure effect.Then,the paper puts forward the appropriate antitrust policy to deal with it.
作者
唐要家
钱声
Tang Yaojia;Qian Shenghui
出处
《竞争政策研究》
2019年第4期56-64,共9页
Competition Policy Research
基金
国家社科基金重点项目“数字经济政府监管再定位及监管体系创新研究”（项目编号：19AJY004）的阶段成果
关键词
平台最惠国条款
竞争效应
反垄断政策
Platform MFN Clauses
Competitive Effect
Anti-Monopoly Policy
