中国是否应该加入欧盟——加拿大临时仲裁机制？

China’s Position toward the EU-Canada Interim Arbitration Mechanism

当前世界贸易组织争端解决机制面临的危机源自美国和欧盟之间的历史矛盾。在世界贸易组织上诉机构即将陷入瘫痪之际,欧盟和加拿大提出两国将以临时仲裁机制("欧-加临时仲裁机制")代替上诉机构。欧-加临时仲裁机制的设立既有迎合美国要求建立一个更灵活的争端解决机制的目的,也有解决多边贸易体系当前危机的积极作用。针对中国是否应该加入这一机制,本文提出两个并不相互排斥、可以灵活交替使用的方案:一是与经常使用世界贸易组织争端解决机制的成员保持一致立场,择机加入临时仲裁机制;二是根据美国大选的形势决定是否加入临时仲裁机制。如果加入欧-加临时仲裁机制,中国应当同其他经常使用世界贸易组织争端解决机制的成员组成共同联盟,推进争端解决机制改革,但不做倡议的牵头者。同时,中国还应当提出以下主张:参与成员方要签订一个包容性整体协议,而不是众多的双边协议;在协议中加入"毒丸条款",抑制美国与加入欧-加临时仲裁机制的成员建立新机制的动机。

The current crisis in the WTO Appellate Body(AB)has its origins from the historical conflicts between the United States and EU.Given the imminent paralysis of the Appellate Body,EU and Canada announced on 25 July,2019 an agreement to establish an interim appeal arbitration system,docked on article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.While the EU-Canada solution has the effect of partially meeting the US interests in a more flexible dispute settlement mechanism,it is more important to recognize its positive contributions to resolving the crisis faced by the multilateral trading system.An essential issue now is that what position China should take regarding the EU-Canada interim mechanism.This article suggests two alternatives for China.First,China should align its position with major users of the WTO dispute settlement system and join the EU-Canada interim solution upon successful coordination with those major users.Second,China may wait for the results of the 2020 US elections without joining the EU-Canada interim solution immediately.By then,China may bein a better position to assess what the long-term US policy would be toward the AB and WTO in general.These two courses of action are not exclusive and should be applied flexibly in light of new developments.If China decides to join the EU-Canada interim arbitration mechanism,(1)it should propose signing a broad single interim agreement instead of multiple bilateral agreements;(2)it should form a"coalition of the willing"with some major users of the dispute settlement mechanism to achieve the objective instead of acting as a leader of the initiative;(3)it may consider incorporating a"poison pill"type of clause into the agreement to make it difficult or impossible for any participant to join other arbitration agreement with non-participants(i.e.the US).It is also noted in the article that China,when seeking solutions for the AB impasse,should avoid pressuring the US to the extent that would establish the arbitration procedures in its own terms.