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择机还是共谋——内部人减持前的分析师行为 被引量:14

Timing or collusion:The behavior of analyst before insider selling
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摘要 从“互惠式”的利益框架出发,分析了我国上市公司内部人会否以及如何利用信息优势与证券分析师形成关联,并损害外部投资者利益的命题.使用2007年~2013年内部人减持与分析师评级数据,研究发现:1)分析师在内部人减持前会集中发布乐观评级报告,内部人减持的金额与分析师乐观评级的数量正相关;2)这一关系在非高管股东与高管股东减持时均存在,并随高管影响力的提升而增强;3)这一关系更可能在内部人管理公司信息环境动机强烈时出现;4)内部人和分析师的以上行为增加了彼此收益,内部人通过减持获得了超额收益,而分析师获取了更多私有信息.这些证据总体上支持了公司内部人与分析师“共谋”的猜想,这些发现全面地展现了公司内部人与分析师进行互惠利益交换的动机、手段与后果,增进了对新兴资本市场中公司内部人与分析师互动行为的理解,也为监管部门加强披露监管、打击内幕交易、维护市场秩序提供了一定启发. Ownership concentration and the resulted"insider controln constitute an important basis for the game between insiders and outside investors of listed companies in China.Within the framework of"reciprocal altruism,,,this paper investigates whether and how corporate insiders interact with security analysts,by making use of information superiority,and damage the interests of outside investors.Using the data of reducing holding-shares of insiders and the rating data of analysts during the period 2007-2013,the following conclusions are drawn.Firstly,optimistic rating reports are usually intensively issued before insider selling,and the number of optimistic rating reports is positively associated with insider selling value.Secondly,the relation above exists in the insider selling of both non-executive shareholders and executive shareholders,and increases with the influence of the executives.Thirdly,this relation is more likely when the insiders have a stronger mo-tivation to manage the corporate information environment.Fourthly,both the insiders and analysts benefit:the insiders gain excess earnings by selling shares while the analysts gain more private information.Such evidence supports the collusion idea between corporate insiders and security analysts.The findings in this paper comprehensively present the motivation,means and consequences of the reciprocal altruism between insiders and security analysts,promote the understanding of the interactive behaviors between corporate insiders and security analysts in emerging capital markets,and provide certain inspirations for supervisors in the regulation of information disclosure,fight against insider transactions and the maintanence of market order.
作者 孙淑伟 梁上坤 付宇翔 朱红军 SUN Shu-wei;LIANG Shang-kun;FU Yu-xiang;ZHU Hong-jun(School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,China;School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China;Shanghai International Trust Co.,Ltd.,Shanghai 200002,China;Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第12期105-123,共19页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602112,71872196,71372039) 北京市社会科学基金资助项目(15JGC176) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目 中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划资助项目。
关键词 内部人减持 证券分析师 乐观评级报告 共谋 insider selling security analyst optimistic rating report collusion
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