统一监管还是分业监管——基于不完全契约的视角

Integrated Regulation or Separated Regulation: An Analysis from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory

金融监管的组织模式变革是一场持续悠久且影响深远的世界性“实验”。本文基于不完全契约理论,以“制定监管标准权”的归属作为统一监管与分业监管的重要区别,从监管能力与监管标准入手考察不同监管组织模式的边界。通过对不同金融监管组织模式下的监管投入以及社会总效用的比较,我们发现:(1)分业监管下会存在因监管标准不一致而带来的卸责问题;(2)只有当高能力监管者的监管标准较为宽松、双方监管标准差异较小的情况下,统一监管后的社会总效用才会高于分业监管时的总效用;(3)监管机构间监管能力差异较大、金融混业程度较低时统一监管的适用边界更大。以上结论在一定程度上为现有金融监管组织模式的实践和改革提供了理论解释。

Financial regulation reform is a long-lasting and far-reaching worldwide“experiment”.Based on the incomplete contract theory.This paper takes the“the right to establish regulatory standards”as an important difference between integrated regulation and separated regulation,and examines the boundaries of different regulatory organizations from the perspective of regulatory capacity and regulatory standards.Through the comparison of regulation investment and total social utility under different financial regulation modes,the paper finds that under separate regulation,there exists“free-riding”problem because of inconsistent regulation standards.In the case of loose regulation standard for high-capacity regulators and small differences in regulation standards between the two sides,the society total utility will be higher under integrated regulation.The application boundary of integrated regulation will be larger when the regulatory capacity is of large difference,or the financial mixed operation degree is at a low level.To some extent,the above conclusions provide a theoretical explanation for the practice and reform of the existing financial regulation mode.