存在问题：从胡塞尔到海德格尔——再论“镜像关系”何以可能

The Question of Being, from Husserl to Heidegger: Rethinking How the “Mirror-Image Relation” Is Possible

着眼于意向性的敞开性维度,海德格尔将《逻辑研究》中被理解为充实上的一致性的存在概念诠释为去蔽,以此获得了被胡塞尔在认识论研究中错失了的自身被给予的存在。但在其对胡塞尔的批判中,作为生存论建构之镜像的超越论的绝对存在却被压抑了,同时被压抑的还有他本人一早就确立的单义的最高存在与超越的一所建构的存在之间的根本差异,在此意义上,海德格尔通过重新诠释“无”所实现的思想转向的实质就是返回单义的最高存在。单义存在为他的尼采批判和四方域的建构提供了基础,但这种环形存在仍然可以在数学形式上获得理解。在思的范式上,现象学急需新的突破。

Focusing on the openness dimension of intentionality,Heidegger reinterprets the concept of Being,which means a fulfilling consistency in Logic Investigation,as a more primitive aletheia in order to gain the selfgiven Being which is missed in Husserl’s epistemology.But in his critique of Husserl,the concept of transcendental Absolute Being as the mirror-image of the construction of existentialism as well as the fundamental difference between the univocal highest Being and the Being constituted by the transcendent One that he established early on have been suppressed.In this sense,Heidegger’s“turn”of thought realized by reinterpreting“nothingness”is essentially a return to the univocity of the highest Being.The univocity of the Being provides him the basis for his critique of Nietzsche and the construction of the quartet domain,but this circular Being can still be understood in a mathematical form.As for the paradigm of thinking,phenomenology needs urgently new breakthroughs.